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following characteristics of research: the inherent uncertainty of researching, the 
existence of a wage premium associated to innovative activities, and moral 
hazard. Assuming that a higher R&D effort translates into a higher R&D success 
probability, we show that when the R&D success probability is low, the economy 
is not willing to bear the risk associated to R&D activities. As a consequence, few 
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increases sufficiently, then the risk associated with R&D activities drops and the 
economy hires more researchers. Consequently, growth does depend on the 
R&D success probability and technological advancement becomes a driving 
force of the economy. We show that imperfect information widens this R&D 
poverty trap. We also show that subsidizing R&D through researchers' hiring 
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1 Introduction
Technological advancement has defined our understanding of the economic ac-
tivity through successive eras of our contemporary history. If modern economic
history can be said to have started with the Industrial Revolution, a period of
great innovation, we currently live in the Information Age, an era whose exis-
tence and evolution is defined by technology. The growing influence of technol-
ogy on the economic activity justifies a closer look at the mechanisms governing
R&D and its impact on the long-term behavior of the economy. Thus, and since
the seminal paper of Romer (1990), a vaste literature has focused on R&D as
one of the most important engines of growth. This literature has two main,
and opposite, branches. On one hand, for some economists as Romer (1990),
an economy with few resources devoted to research and, in particular, with few
researchers, will grow at low rates. Naturally, having fewer people dedicated to
research makes less likely the creation of new products and innovations. Then,
the success probability that any researcher has of inventing a new design in any
period, or R&D success probability, becomes a crucial element in explaining
growth. A higher R&D success probability implies a higher growth rate. On
the other hand, for other economists as Jones (1995a), the amount of resources
devoted to research or the number of researchers have no effect on growth, at
least in the long run, but their growth rates. As a consequence, the R&D success
probability has no role in the determination of growth. In this case, a higher
R&D success probability implies the same growth rate. Therefore, a question
arises naturally: which theory is (mostly) correct?
In view of Figure 1, it seems that there is no correlation between the re-
sources devoted to research and growth.1 In fact, Jones (1995a) already showed
the same results for the number of scientists. In any case, are the total resources
devoted to research a good measure of the R&D effort of a country? Figure 2
shows the correlation between the Summary Innovation Index (SII) elaborated
by the EU and economic growth. This index gives an overview of aggregate
national innovation performance and is a composite indicator of 25 measures
ranging from 0 (worst performance) to 1 (best performance).2,3 From the data,
1The same lack of correlation arises with respect to GERD, either in per capita value or
only the part made by private sectors, or the time serie for US.
2We have normalized the SII to 100 in the figure. Also, we have chosen the year 2003, as
it is the only one publicly available.
3Alternative measures of R&D effort, like the Global Innovation Index elaborated by the
WIPO or the Science, Technology and Industry Index elaborated by the OECD also have
problems with the public availability of their data.
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Figure 1: Mean TFP growth (2003-2008) and 2003 Gross Domestic Expenditure
on R&D (GERD) in thousands of millions at current PPP (2004 for Switzerland
and Australia). Source: OECD. R2 = 0.011 with a correlation of 0.103.
it seems clear that there are some other causes apart from total resources that
can explain the relationship between growth and R&D. The goal of this paper
is to show that economic growth is heavily connected to the R&D effort of a
country. We achieve this goal by exploring the inherent characteristics of the
researching activity. In particular, we focus on the following characteristics: the
uncertainty of researching, the wage premium associated to innovative activi-
ties, and moral hazard. In particular, we assume that a higher R&D effort by a
country translates into a higher R&D success probability. We first analyze the
case of perfect information: the principal or employer R&D firm observes the re-
searcher’s effort. Note that perfect information does not eliminate uncertainty,
since we still have a R&D success probability. We show that when this R&D
success probability is low, a risk averse economy is not willing to bear the risk
associated to R&D activities. Consequently, a small number of researchers are
hired and growth does not depend on the R&D success probability or research
productivity. But, if for any reason, an economy increases its R&D effort such
that the R&D success probability increases sufficiently, then the risk associated
to R&D activities falls and the economy hires more researchers. As a conse-
quence, growth does depend on the R&D success probability and technology
advancement becomes a driving force of the economy.
Unlike other economic activities dealing with more “physical” goods, with
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Figure 2: Mean TFP growth (2003-2008) and SII2003. Sources: OECD and
European Commission. R2 = 0.392 with a correlation of 0.626.
outputs that can be easily measured and predicted, researching usually involves
some degree of uncertainty. Economists are familiar with this reality: study
hard to obtain a not-so-good mark, spend days trying to incorporate an idea
to a paper unsuccessfully or, on the contrary, have a great idea while watching
the R.C.D. Espanyol football team on TV. This uncertainty can be extended
to most R&D activities and is incorporated into our economy. We depart from
the well-known model of Romer (1990) by having an R&D sector dedicated to
create patents for new intermediate goods with researchers that do not invent
patents immediately, but merely possess a probability of creating one. This
R&D success probability will be higher if the researcher makes an “effort”, or
“works hard”, and will be lower otherwise, what we call “shirking”.
But, what is this “effort” in our economy? To understand it, we have to take
a look at a well-documented phenomenon: the existence of a wage premium on
innovation related sectors over the average sector.4 There are many explanations
for this premium, but we are sticking to the “compensatory theory”: being a
productive worker in a research-related job usually requires the acquisition of
skills through education. That way, the higher salaries would be the reflection
of a compensation for this previous effort and the higher productivity of the
workers because of this effort. In our economy, we define two levels of effort,
4See, for example, Katz and Murphy (1992).
5
high and low. The high effort makes the workers in the R&D sector to be more
productive, so that the R&D success probability becomes higher. The low effort
can be considered the default level of effort, the effort of “just working” in any
sector of this economy.
That leads us to the last insight, on information. There is no education
sector in our economy, so that workers are self-taught. Under this condition, all
the workers have ex-ante the same productivity for the principal or employer
R&D firm, who cannot verify if the researcher has worked hard or shirked. A
problem of moral hazard arises naturally: the employer’s profits depend directly
on the effort of the worker, but the effort is costly and cannot be observed by the
employer, which gives the worker an incentive to shirk. However, as the R&D
success probability increases with effort, the result of the researching activity
gives some hint on the behavior of the researcher. That opens the possibility
for firms to incentive researchers to work hard by offering a higher salary when
succeeding, which is more probable when the effort is present, and penalizing
them when failing. That also means, however, that the wage premium will be
higher when there exists this kind of informational problem, as researchers have
to be compensated for both the effort and the uncertainty.
The existence of a principal-agent informational problem where the researcher
knows the effort exerted but not the principal who hires her, widens the likeli-
hood of a technological poverty trap: a situation where the economy is stacked
in a low growth environment due to the uncertainty associated to the research-
ing activity. This situation arises when the R&D success probability is too low.
In this case, no principal is willing to pay the researcher enough so that she
exerts the high effort. As a consequence, the economy grows at a constant rate
which is independent of the R&D success probability (although it could grow
at a higher rate through a higher effort). In order for the principal to be willing
to pay the researcher for the high effort, a sufficiently high R&D success proba-
bility is needed. In that case, growth depends on the R&D success probability
and the economy leaves the R&D poverty trap.
Surprisingly, incentivizing R&D through a subsidy on researchers’ hiring
increases growth, but it does not increase the likelihood of enforcing the high
effort. That is, the subsidy is not able to reduce the R&D success probability
that makes the economy to leave the R&D poverty trap. But, once this threshold
probability is exceeded, the gap between the high R&D effort growth rate and
the low R&D effort growth rate becomes bigger. Moreover, the subsidy widens
the R&D poverty trap. Hence, instead of subsidizing R&D through researchers’
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hiring, a government should implement policies aimed at increasing the R&D
effort or success probability. Additionally, two comments must be made. First,
any change in the R&D success probability could be due to an increase in
total population, human capital or education, population density, or knowledge
concentration (marshallian industrial districts), all of them part of the R&D
effort of a country. Although Galor and Weil (2000) make technological progress
to be directly governed by total population and education, we focus on the
relation between technological progress and the R&D success probability. And
second, once the R&D poverty trap is left behind, our economy predicts a
positive correlation between income and R&D effort.
This paper is related to two branches of macroeconomics: how R&D af-
fects growth, and how effort affects aggregate production. Since we depart
from Romer (1990), our economy suffers from absolute scale effects. Certainly,
population enhances growth, since more population means more researchers,
more designs and higher growth. These scale effects were discredited in Jones
(1995a,b), that proposed a modification of the Romer’s economy that eliminates
the absolute scale effects (but introduce relative scale effects). That way, it is
the population growth what enhances growth, although population and produc-
tion continue to be related. Obviously, since in Jones’ model the R&D success
probability has no effect on growth, the informational problem has no effect on
growth, either. Sa´nchez-Losada (2014) discusses the causes of absolute and rel-
ative scale effects and proposes an alternative modeling. However, even though
the presence of scale effects could undermine the global appeal of the results
of this paper, our intention is to show the effects of R&D effort, R&D success
probabilities and information on growth.
There are few papers in macroeconomics analyzing the effects of effort on
aggregate production. An exhaustive analysis can be found in Leamer (1999).
He proposes a production function where effort enters as total factor produc-
tivity, giving rise to a set of contracts paying for a higher effort. However, this
paper has no informational problems, which are incorporated in Acemoglu and
Newman (2002) and Bental and Demougin (2006). In both papers, the existence
of asymmetric information creates the need for monitoring of the workers’ effort
by the firms. In the former, monitoring affects the corporate structure of firms,
which in turn affects output, while in the latter monitoring affects total factor
productivity through effort. To our knowledge, there is no paper analyzing the
relationship between asymmetric information and effort, and R&D.
The addition of R&D effort, R&D success probabilities, wage premia and
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informational problems to the original model of Romer (1990) will no doubt
allow us to improve our understanding of the foundations of economic growth.
Section 2 outlines our modified version of the Romer’s economy with the addition
of theses new features. We discuss two variations of the model: a benchmark
version with perfect information and a version with imperfect information, so
that we can easily distinguish the formal effects of moral hazard. That is the
objective of Section 4. In between, Section 3 discusses the role of a subsidy
on R&D, while an account of the influence of the other additions (R&D effort,
R&D success probabilities and wage premia) are discussed in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 concludes, reflecting on the formal results of the previous sections
while making a first approximation to some policy issues that can be extracted
from the main conclusions of the model.
2 Perfect information: the benchmark economy
Our framework is a modified overlapping-generations version of the well-known
Romer’s economy. Even though this model has lost some appeal, after some
features of the model were subsequently rebutted, we think that it remains an
excellent and tractable framework to analyze the effects of technology on growth.
We develop first a benchmark economy with perfect information. The results
obtained on this setup will be subsequently compared with those obtained when
introducing asymmetric information on the economy: a moral hazard problem
in the R&D sector. As many of the features of the model are common with
those of the Romer’s economy, we move quickly through these and focus on the
proposed additions.
There are three sectors in this economy. A competitive research sector uses
labor and the existing stock of technology to produce new designs. A monopo-
listically competitive intermediate goods sector uses these designs and foregone
output to produce inputs for a final goods sector. Apart from the intermedi-
ate goods, the competitive final goods sector uses labor to produce final output,
which can be either consumed or saved. Thus, there are two basic inputs, capital
and labor, with their productivities affected by the state of technology. Capital
is measured in units of consumption goods. Each individual is endowed with
one unit of labor supplied inelastically. We assume constant population L.5
Technology A is measured as the number of designs for intermediate goods
5Since in Romer (1990) there are scale effects and we follow his model, we need this
assumption for a balanced growth path to exist.
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in the economy.6 Therefore, the invention of new designs counts as an increase
in A. Technology is advanced by the effort of the LA researchers working in the
R&D sector. Any researcher has a probability δ of inventing a new design in
any period t, or R&D success probability, so that this occurrence is a random
variable following a Bernoulli distribution of parameter δ. If we assume the
work of the researchers at any moment to be independent of each other, the
aggregate effort of the LA researchers is a random variable following a Binomial
distribution with parameters (LA, δ).
7 The average of this variable is LAδ, so
that the evolution of the technology in this economy can be described by the
equation At+1 = At + AtLAδ. That is, the number of designs the next period
will be the number of designs this period plus the number of newly invented
designs, itself a function of currently existing designs. Hence, the growth rate
of technology gA is
At+1 −At
At
= gA = LAδ. (1)
Final output Y is produced in a perfectly competitive environment with
a combination of intermediate goods and labor LY . Intermediate goods are
indexed by the integer i and limited by the state of the technology. Therefore,
{xi}Ai=1 is the list of intermediate goods available for a final goods firm. Each
final goods firm maximizes profits,8
LαY
(
A∑
i=1
xi
1−α
)
− wY LY −
A∑
i=1
pixi, (2)
where the production function is a` la Dixit-Stiglitz, wY is the wage paid in this
sector per unit of labor, and pi is the price of the intermediate good i. The
optimality conditions are
wY = αL
α−1
Y
(
A∑
i=1
xi
1−α
)
, (3)
pi = L
α
Y (1− α)xi−α. (4)
Since workers are employed either in the final goods sector or in the R&D
6We omit the time subscript until necessary.
7If X1, ..., Xn are independent, identically distributed random variables, all Bernoulli dis-
tributed with success probability ξ, then Y =
n∑
k=1
Xk ∼ Binomial(n, ξ).
8The final good price pY is normalized to one.
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sector, we have
L = LY + LA. (5)
A producer of an intermediate good purchases a design created on the R&D
sector, which confers monopoly power over that particular good. As in Romer
(1990), we assume a putty-putty technology, where we need η units of final good
to produce 1 unit of intermediate good. The problem faced by each firm i is to
maximize the difference between its revenue pixi, and its expenses rηxi, subject
to its inverse demand function (4), where r is the interest rate and there is no
depreciation. The optimality condition is
pi =
rη
1− α, (6)
and, then, profits pii are
pii = αpixi. (7)
From now on, we will only consider the symmetric case, where all the firms
in the intermediate goods sector produce the same quantity x, set the same
price p and have the same profits pi. Then, we have that
A∑
i=1
xi
1−α =
A∑
i=1
x1−α = Ax1−α. (8)
Individuals live for two periods: in the first period they work and receive a
wage w. This salary is allocated between consumption c and savings s. In the
second period they are retired, so that their income is the return on savings Rs,
where R is the interest factor, which is entirely consumed as d. The individual
utility function,
U(c, d, E) = ln c+ β ln d− lnE, (9)
where β ∈ (0, 1), captures the idea that individuals derive utility from consump-
tion and disutility from the effort E they have to exert at work. Solving the
intertemporal individual problem, we have
s =
(
β
1 + β
)
w, c =
(
1
1 + β
)
w, d =
(
β
1 + β
)
Rw, (10)
and substituting these conditions into equation (9) we obtain the indirect utility
function
V (w,E,R) = (1 + β) lnw − lnE + β lnR+ Z, (11)
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where Z is a constant.
A firm in the R&D competitive sector maximizes profits pAALAδ − wALA,
where wA is the wage paid in this sector per unit of labor and pA is the price
of a new design. Furthermore, in the R&D sector workers face a decision: they
can shirk and apply a low effort El normalized to one, El = 1, which yields
an R&D success probability δl; or they can work hard and apply a high effort
Eh > El, which yields an R&D success probability δh > δl.
Additionally, we assume that working in the final goods sector always re-
quires an effort equal to one. With that, we do not imply that working in the
R&D sector is harder than working in the final goods sector, but that being a
highly productive worker in the R&D sector requires an extra effort, in terms
of education, that working in the final goods sector does not.
With perfect information firms know whether the worker has worked hard
or shirked. Therefore, workers will be paid according to the effort they have
applied. Moreover, in this setup workers are risk averse, as their utility function
is concave with respect to the wage, and firms are risk neutral, as the profit
function is linear with respect to income. That means that firms will bear all
the inherent risk of the research activity and will completely insure workers by
rewarding them regardless of the result of their research.9
For the moment, we will assume that firms are interested in extracting the
high effort from their workers, although lately we will analyze the conditions
under which this assumption holds. To enforce the low effort, firms simply have
to offer a salary wlA = wY , so that workers obtain the same utility working
in the final goods sector than shirking in the R&D sector, since in both cases
workers make the same effort. To enforce the high effort, however, firms need to
compensate the worker for the effort.10 In that case, the optimization problem
of a firm trying to make its researchers to work hard will be subject to a par-
ticipation constraint that reflects this compensation. This restriction expresses
that a hard worker in the R&D sector must have at least the same utility than
a worker in the final goods sector11, that is, V (whA, Eh, R) = V (wY , 1, R), where
whA is the wage paid for the high effort. This restriction can be rewritten as
9To shield themselves from the risk, it can be assumed a pooling of the R&D firms, where
they are able to issue state-contingent securities. In that way, by holding a diversified portfolio
from all the R&D firms in this economy, firms can dispose of any idiosyncratic risk inherent
to their own projects.
10For an introduction on economics of information, see Macho-Stadler and Pe´rez-Castrillo
(2001).
11Since individuals are identical, the labor market clearing condition makes the restriction
to bind.
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whA = wY Ê, where Ê = E
1
1+β
h . We call Ê the wage premium of working hard in
the R&D sector versus shirking. The problem of the representative R&D firm
is
Max pihA = pAALAδh − whALA
s.t. whA = wY Ê = αL
α−1
Y Ax
1−αÊ, (12)
where we have used equations (3) and (8). Free entry makes profits to be zero,
which implies that
pA =
αLα−1Y x
1−αÊ
δh
. (13)
The price of a new design reflects the incentives of the producers of inter-
mediate goods to acquire it. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991), we can
express that, at every moment in time, the instantaneous excess of revenue over
the marginal cost must be just sufficient to cover the interest cost on the initial
investment in a design. Or, in other words, the price of a design is equal to the
present value of the net revenue that a monopolist can extract. In our case, that
means pit/pAt +
(
pAt+1 − pAt
)
/pAt = rt, which combined with equations (4),
(7) and (13), and evaluating in the balanced growth path where pAt+1 = pAt ,
gives
LY =
Ê
δh
r
1− α. (14)
And substituting equations (5) and (14) into equation (1) yields
gA = δhL− Êr
1− α. (15)
We now focus on the behavior of capital K. Because it takes η units of
forgone consumption to create one unit of intermediate good, total usage of
capital is
K = η
A∑
i=1
xi = ηAx. (16)
Since individuals work in either the final goods sector or the R&D sector, the
capital market clearing condition is(
β
1 + β
)[
(L− LY )whAt + LY wY t
]
= Lst = Kt+1 + pAtAt+1,
where we have used equations (5) and (10). Using the fact that pihA = 0 and
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equations (4), (6), (12), (14) and (16), in the balanced growth path we have that
pAtAt+1 = Kt+1[α/(1−α)]. Combining these last two equations with equations
(3), (4), (6), (8), (12), (14) and (16), we obtain
Kt+1 = Λ
[
δhL− rt(Ê − 1)
1− α
]
Kt,
where Λ = [αβ/ (1 + β)] < 1. Rewriting this equation gives
gK = Λ
[
δhL− r(Ê − 1)
1− α
]
− 1. (17)
Finally, substituting the definition of capital in the production function
yields Y = LαYAx
1−α = (LYA)αK1−αηα−1, which tells us that Y, K and A
must grow at the same rate in the balanced growth path. Therefore, equations
(15) and (17) give
gh =
ΛδhL− Ê
Ê − Λ(Ê − 1) , (18)
where the subindex h indicates that this is the growth rate of the high R&D
effort economy. But firms are not always interested on extracting the high effort
from their workers. By comparing profits of R&D firms when they offer a salary
whA = wY Ê (so that workers work hard and the R&D success probability is
δh) and when they offer a salary w
l
A = wY (so that workers always shirk and
the R&D success probability is δl), and noting that by equation (12) we have
pihA = 0 = pAAδh − wY Ê, then R&D firms are interested in the high effort if
pihA = 0 > pi
l
A = LA (pAAδl − wY ), that happens whenever
δh > δ˜h = δlÊ. (19)
That is, R&D firms only want their workers to work hard if the likelihood ratio
of inventing a new design δh/δl is greater than the wage premium Ê. In other
words, they are willing to pay for the high effort if the gain in probability derived
from working hard is greater than the bonus they have to pay to achieve this
high effort. This condition separates the states where R&D firms are interested
in making their workers to work hard, so that the growth rate of the economy
is gh, and the states where enforcing the high effort is simply not worthy, so
that the wage premium and the effort is 1 and, therefore, the growth rate of the
economy is gl = ΛδlL− 1.
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1
Figure 3: Growth as a function of δh
Figure 3 shows these states by depicting the growth rate as a function of
δh. Note that the growth rates can be negative due to the chosen normalization
of the effort. For this reason we assume that δl > 1/ΛL. Also note that this
figure does not show a possible evolution of the economy as δh grows, since we
are only dealing with the analysis on the balanced growth path.
In order to draw Figure 3, note that gh = gl whenever
δh = δ̂h = δl[Ê − Λ(Ê − 1)] + (Ê − 1)/L. (20)
Then, by comparing equations (19) and (20) we have that δ˜h > δ̂h. Figure 3
expresses that if we have two economies, then the economy with the higher δh
will grow at a higher rate unless both economies are trapped in the area where
enforcing the high effort is not worthy. In this area, both economies grow at the
same rate gl. Moreover, we can have the case
12 where although the high R&D
effort economy would grow at a higher rate, the market takes the economy to a
low growth rate. This situation is what we call a R&D poverty trap, a situation
where the economy is stacked in a low growth environment due to the uncertain
nature of the researching activity. Moreover, in this case an improvement of δh
does not guarantee a faster growth rate.
12δh ∈ (δ̂h, δ˜h).
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3 Perfect information: the role of a subsidy on
R&D
It is clear from Romer (1990) that a subsidy on R&D enhances growth through
an increase in the number of researchers. But does such a subsidy affect the
R&D poverty trap? That is, does the subsidy make it more likely to enforce
the high effort? Is the subsidy able to reduce the R&D success probability that
makes the economy to leave the R&D poverty trap?
Consider a government that subsidizes the hiring of researches through a tax
on labor income. Thus, the government gives a proportional subsidy z on R&D
wages and sets a proportional tax τ on households’ wages. The government
budget constraint is
[LAwA + LY wY ] τ = LAwAz. (21)
From the intertemporal individual problem, we now have
s =
(
β
1 + β
)
w (1− τ) , c =
(
1
1 + β
)
w (1− τ) , d =
(
β
1 + β
)
Rw (1− τ) ,
(22)
and substituting them into equation (9) gives the following indirect utility func-
tion:
V (w,E,R) = (1 + β) lnw − lnE + β lnR+ (1 + β) ln (1− τ) + Z,
from where we have that the participation constraint remains unchanged and,
thus, equation (12) is still valid.
The problem of the representative R&D firm is
Max pihA = pAALAδh − whA (1− z)LA
subject to equation (12). Since free entry makes profits to be zero, then
pA =
αLα−1Y x
1−αÊ (1− z)
δh
. (23)
Substituting this price into the non-arbitrage condition yields
LY =
Ê
δh
r (1− z)
1− α . (24)
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And substituting equations (5) and (24) into equation (1) gives
gA = δhL− Êr (1− z)
1− α . (25)
Using equations (21) and (22), and operating similarly to the previous sec-
tion, from the capital market clearing condition we have
gK = Λ
δhL− r
[
Ê (1− z)− 1
]
1− α
− 1. (26)
And combining equations (25) and (26) gives
gsh =
ΛδhL− Ê(1− z)
Ê(1− z)− Λ[Ê(1− z)− 1] , (27)
where the superscript s denotes that the growth rate is with a subsidy. When
R&D firms are not interested in making their workers to work hard, so that
the wage premium and the effort is 1, the growth rate of the economy is
gsl = [ΛδlL− (1− z)] / [1− z (1− Λ)] . Note that ∂gsh/∂z > 0 and ∂gsl /∂z > 0.
Moreover, the slope of gsh is bigger than the slope of gh. Also note that by
equation (12) we have pihA = 0 = pAAδh−wY Ê (1− z) , and that R&D firms are
interested in the high effort if pihA = 0 > pi
l
A = LA [pAAδl − wY (1− z)] , what
happens whenever δh > δ˜h. Finally, g
s
h = g
s
l whenever
δh = δh =
δl
(
Ê(1− z)− Λ[Ê(1− z)− 1]
)
+ (1− z)(Ê − 1)/L
1− z(1− Λ) . (28)
Note that ∂δh/∂z < 0. Moreover, δh
∣∣
z=0
= δ̂h and δh
∣∣
z=1
= δl. Figure 4 shows
the economy with and without the subsidy. The subsidy increases growth, but it
does not increase the likelihood of enforcing the high effort. That is, the subsidy
is not able to reduce the R&D success probability that makes the economy to
leave the R&D poverty trap. But, once this threshold probability is exceeded,
the gap between the high R&D effort growth rate and the low R&D effort
growth rate becomes greater. Moreover, the subsidy widens the R&D poverty
trap; that is, the values of δh for which there is a poverty trap situation.
In view of the results, it is more interesting to wonder if a government can
alter either the likelihood ratio of inventing a new design or the wage premium.
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Figure 4: Growth with a subsidy as a function of δh
We claim that it is likely that a government can alter both by investing in R&D
infrastructures or subsidizing the R&D capital, aspects that are not modeled
in this paper. We therefore imply that the R&D success probability δh has
some degree of endogeneity, and that it may depend on, for example, total
population, total number of researchers, or infrastructure like labs, such that
any government policy altering one of these variables may change the R&D
effort of an economy.
4 Imperfect information and moral hazard
In this section, we modify the benchmark economy by adding imperfect infor-
mation in the R&D sector. The rest of the economy remains unaltered, so that
equations (1) through (11) hold. Now, R&D firms are unable to distinguish if
their employees have worked hard or have shirked. The only information firms
have is the final result of the researching process: whether a new design has
been invented or not. Hence, a problem of moral hazard arises.
If, as in our benchmark economy, R&D firms were to insure completely the
researchers by paying them the same salary regardless of the outcome, the re-
searchers would shirk, as the employers cannot observe their effort and there are
no consequences for their action. Therefore, if firms are interested in extracting
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the low effort from the researchers, they just need to pay a salary wlA = wY
regardless of the result, which leads the economy to a growth rate gl = ΛδlL−1.
Instead, if firms are interested in extracting the high effort from the researchers,
they cannot insure their workers completely and will have to pay them according
to the result of their work. If the researcher manages to discover a new design
she will be paid a salary wgA; otherwise, she will be paid w
b
A < w
g
A. This feature
adds a new restriction to the problem of the R&D firm. Not only it has to lure
the worker from the final goods sector (the participation constraint), but it must
also offer an incentive such that the worker prefers working hard to shirking.
This new restriction is the incentives constraint. This restriction states that
under the two-salaries payment scheme we have described, the expected utility
of working hard must equal the expected utility of shirking.13 Furthermore, now
the participation constraint changes slightly to reflect the new payment scheme.
Formally, both restrictions are
δhV (w
g
A, Eh, R) + (1− δh)V (wbA, Eh, R) = V (wY , 1, R),
δhV (w
g
A, Eh, R) + (1− δh)V (wbA, Eh, R) = δlV (wgA, 1, R) + (1− δl)V (wbA, 1, R).
Combining both restrictions and using equation (11), we have
wgA = wY Ê
1−δl
δh−δl , (29)
wbA = wY Ê
−δl
δh−δl . (30)
Now we have two different wage premia, one when the researcher discovers a
new design and other (actually, a penalty) when she fails. Therefore, we can
define the expected wage premium when the researcher works hard as
E˜ = δhÊ
1−δl
δh−δl + (1− δh)Ê
−δl
δh−δl . (31)
The problem of a representative R&D firm is
Max pihA = pAALAδh − [δhwgA + (1− δh)wbA]LA (32)
subject to equations (29) and (30). Free entry implies zero profits. Hence, using
13See footnote 11.
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equations (3) and (8), we have
pA =
αLα−1Y x
1−αE˜
δh
. (33)
This condition is the equivalent to equation (13) but switching from the per-
fect information wage premium Ê to the imperfect information expected wage
premium E˜. Replicating the computations of the benchmark economy, in the
balanced growth path we have
gmh =
ΛδhL− E˜
E˜ − Λ(E˜ − 1) , (34)
where the superscript m denotes that the growth rate is with moral hazard.
However, R&D firms will not always be interested in extracting the high effort
from their employees. Comparing profits when firms use the two-wage scheme
and extract the high effort, and when firms use the single salary scheme so that
workers shirk, we obtain a condition similar to the perfect information case but
with the expected wage premium,14
δh > δ˜
m
h = δlE˜. (35)
Figure 5 shows these states. To draw it, we have that δh = δ̂
m
h = δl[E˜ −
Λ(E˜ − 1)] + (E˜ − 1)/L when gmh = gl. Noting from Figure 6 that E˜ ≥ Ê, we
have that gmh ≤ gh, and with equality when δh = 1. Also note that δ˜mh ≥ δ˜h and
δ̂mh > δ̂h. The case of imperfect information increases the range of values of δh for
which the economy falls to a state of low growth due to the fact that exhorting
the high effort is not worthy. Therefore, imperfect information widens the R&D
poverty trap, so that the excessive uncertainty of the researching activity is
aggravated by the imperfect information on the researchers’ behavior.
5 Discussion of the results
Now, we can establish a comparative analysis of the effects on growth of changes
to the discovery probabilities, the wage premia and the information structure.
It is, however, a comparison between stationary states, as we are not discussing
the dynamic properties of the model.
14Note that since E˜ depends on δh, the exact δh satisfying this equation is implicitly defined.
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Figure 5: Growth with moral hazard as a function of δh
First, it is usually thought that an increase in the R&D success probability
when working hard increases the growth rate since a bigger probability means
bigger income for the R&D firms and, then, a bigger share of the labor force
working in the technological sector, which offers higher salaries and, thus, con-
sumption and production increase. In our paper, however, an economy with a
higher R&D success probability does not necessarily experience a higher growth
rate. We have shown a situation where enforcing the high effort is not worthy
and the economy drops to gl, which is independent of δh. If the economy founds
itself in this state, an increase on δh will not affect growth, unless it is big
enough to move the economy towards the state where R&D firms prefer their
researchers to work hard. We have called this situation a technological poverty
trap.
Second, an increase in the effort Eh needed to have a higher R&D success
probability reduces the growth rate in both the perfect and the imperfect infor-
mation economies since Λ < 1. Therefore, a higher Eh always slows growth.
Third, we compare the results obtained in our model with perfect and im-
perfect information. The main difference between both economies is the wage
premium, Ê and E˜, so that a comparison between both premia is enough to
unveil the effects of imperfect information. We can deduct, from equation (31),
that generally the expected premium E˜ is greater than the premium with per-
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fect information Ê, as Figure 6 shows. This is an intuitive result, as Ê is merely
compensating the high effort of the researcher whereas E˜, besides, is compen-
sating the risk the researcher has to bear in the imperfect information version.15
The only situation where both wage premia are equal is when δh = 1, that is,
when we have perfect information because there is certainty in the result of the
researching activity: the researcher always invents a design when working hard.
E˜
δh
δl
Ê
1
Figure 6: E˜ as a function of δh
We have also shown that, generally, a higher wage premium slows growth.
Thus, we can conclude that in this economy moral hazard hampers growth:
the bigger the informational problem (intermediate values of δh), the lower
the growth. Moreover, Figure 6 also shows that the higher the R&D success
probability, the lower the expected wage premium, which stimulates growth
through a higher hiring of researchers.
Finally, our economy suffers from absolute scale effects. Certainly, popula-
tion L enhances growth, since more population means more researchers, more
designs and higher growth. However, even though the presence of scale effects
could undermine the global appeal of the results, our intention is to show the
effects of R&D effort, R&D success probabilities and information on growth.
Despite its shortcomings, we consider that this paper offers relevant insights on
15Although we do not provide a formal proof, numerical simulations for a broad range of
parameters confirm this result, which is furthermore consistent with the economic intuition.
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these questions.
6 Conclusions
Through the present paper we have discussed the effects on growth of some
inherent characteristics of researching. We have shown that augmenting the
R&D effort such that the R&D success probability increases, does not guarantee
a higher growth rate, whereas the existence of imperfect information, in the form
of moral hazard, hampers growth. R&D is an engine of growth but, without
the right incentives, there is no extra growth at all. These results are intuitive
and coherent with the literature on innovation.
To conclude this paper, we discuss briefly some implications of the additional
features of our model, which can potentially give rise to new lines of research
or extensions. First, about R&D success probabilities, it is reasonable to think
about them as a measure of the efficiency of research. That way, any action
aimed at increasing this efficiency will enhance growth. An interesting example
of this could be the addition of capital to the R&D technology, as in Sa´nchez-
Losada (2014). It would be the equivalent of economists using computers: going
from manually transposing matrices to compute regressions to using a computer
program clearly increased the probability of making relevant findings. Another
intuitive modification could be making the R&D success probability a function
of the state of the technology, total population, population density, or even
knowledge concentration. That way we could mimic the historical perceived
evolution of research and invention: thinking back to the Industrial Revolution,
many groundbreaking discoveries were made by technicians, with more practi-
cal than theoretical knowledge (see Mokyr and Voth, 2009). In terms of our
model, that is a situation of low Eh, in the sense of education, but also small
difference between δh and δl. On the contrary, the present time appears as one
where the requirements, in terms of knowledge, to be a successful researcher are
ever increasing. That would be a situation of high Eh and a large difference
between δh and δl. Therefore, these dynamics can be replicated by making δh
an increasing function of A and δl a decreasing function of A. In addition, the
feedback between δh and A seems to be consistent with the almost-explosive
technological growth perceived in the modern era.
Second, about R&D effort, we have already seen the intuition to make it
an increasing function of the state of the technology. Furthermore, we have
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concluded than any measure leading to a decrease in the effort needed to be a
highly productive researcher will enhance growth. Following our simile of effort
as education, it would be highly interesting to extend our model to include a
public education system. The final result is unclear, as the effect of the taxation
necessary for this system collides with the effect of the resulting reduction on
Eh.
However, and commenting finally about information, a public education sys-
tem could ameliorate partially the moral hazard problem, as it would allow the
government to certify who has made the effort. Also, following the proposition
of defining the discovering probabilities as a function of A, we can argue that
the advancement of the technology helps growth by reducing the informational
problem. If the gap between δh and δl is progressively widened, the end result
of the researcher’s activity will be progressively more informative over the ap-
plied effort, thus narrowing the gap between Ê and E˜. Finally, any of the usual
measures described in the literature, such as monitoring, aimed at reducing the
problem of information could result in an increase of the growth rate.
To sum up, we tried to dig deeper in the foundations of research and inno-
vation. Technology, with its increasing presence in our daily life, the blooming
possibilities for productivity increases derived from it, and the ever expanding
variety of products and commodities it generates, is guaranteed to retain its
prominent role between the main factors of economic growth. The study of its
basic determinants and its effects over the economy as a whole will continue to
be a focal point of the economic science for the decades to come.
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